INTRODUCTION
Fraudulent identification documents facilitated the free movement of the terrorists who attacked the United States on September 11, 2001 (National Commission 2004 . These attacks and the threat of future terrorist attacks have added urgency to ongoing Congressional efforts to strengthen the country's system for establishing personal identification. Because of the political challenges to instituting a federally-administered national ID, Congress has focused on standardizing the state-issued driver's license. In 2005, Congress passed the REAL ID Act, which prescribes uniform requirements for state driver's licenses that are acceptable for federal identification purposes. 1 In the act, Congress directed that the Secretary of Homeland Security CD HS) issue
:regulations to standardize the driver's license using a form of rulemaking that provides the public only a limited opportunity to participate in the law's implementation.
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The REAL ID Act is controversiaL Its many critics challenge the legitimacy of the law based on both substance and process. Federalism advocates, for example, contend that the REAL ID Act's driver's license provisions impinge on state sovereignty and create insurmountable implementation problems. They object to the House Republican leadership's decision to block a full, bi-partisan discussion of the bill's rnerits. They oppose the repeal of the driver's license provisions of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of2004, which allowed for more input from stakeholders through an executive branch rulemaking process called negotiated rulemaking. While state and local government officials support the goal of driver's license standardization-securer personal identification documents-opposition to the REAL ID Act at the state government level is ahnost universal.
The Secretary of Homeland Security has only recently issued proposed regulations to implement the act and the country's system of personal identification is still insecure. The history of the REAL ID Act suggests that a less prescriptive and more coWiborative approach, such as that exemplified by the Intelligence Reform and Tenorism Prevention Act, might be more likely to produce the secure system of personal identification that the country needs.
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DRIVER'S LICENSE PROVISIONS OF THE REAL ID ACT OF 2005
The driver's license provisions of the REAL ID Act, which will take effect on May 11, 2008, appear in Title II, Division B of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief,
2005
(Public Law 109-13, 49 US.c. 30301 et. seq.) . A summary of the law's sections, based on the conference report, follows (U. S. Congress Congressional Record 2005c) . Section 202 of Title II prescribes minimum standards for the driver's license document. The law applies only to licenses acceptable to federal government agencies as identification. 2 However, state governments must adopt the standards and alter any conflicting state law if the license is to be used as identification for federal purposes. The standards require that the driver's license display full legal name, date of birth, gender, traceable number, digital photograph, principal residence, and signature; employ a standard digital technology that facilitates information exchange; and contain security features to prevent identity fraud. A driver's license or identity card not meeting these standards must have a unique design or color and be clearly marked as unacceptable for federal purposes.
Section 202 also details standards for issuing the driver's license. A temporary license or identity card must expire on the date the non-citizen applicant's authorized stay in the United States ends. A citizen's license must be subject to renewal every eight years. Before a state issues a license, an applicant must present a minimum of five identifying documents, including proof of legal presence in tlle United States. States must verify the validity of each document and also establish a procedure for verifying the information of renewing applicants. States must use digital technology to store identity source documents. Each state must also maintain and make available electronically to other states a database that contains all the data that appear on the driver's license or identity card and the driving history of its owner. In order to reduce fraud, states must train employees to recognize fraudulent documentation, ensure the physical security of the Policy Perspectives locations and materials used in the production of driver's licenses and identity cards, obtain a security clearance for each employee who produces these documents, and make a digital facial image of each applicant, whether or not the state issues the license or identity card.
Section 203 requires that the Secretary of Homeland Security enter into the appropriate aviation security database information about individuals convicted of using a false driver's license at an airport.
Section 204 authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security to make grants during fiscal years [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] to assist states in conforming to the minimum standards for driver's licenses and identity cards. 
PRE-9/11 CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION
One approach to developing a secure system for personal identification would be to require a federallyadministered national In This approach has influential critics, however Former Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich has observed that "the people most opposed to a national ID card are dramatically more passionate than the people who have some vague general support for a national ID card .. _. If we go down that road, it's a dead end. It won't happen" (U. S. Congress House 2002, 50) . Critics of a national ID include privacy groups such as the Electronic Privacy Information Center and civil liberties groups that range on the political spectrum from the liberal American Civil Liberties Union to the conservative Eagle Forum.
The opposition to a national ID reflects the fear of many Americans, dating from the founding of the Republic, that a strong central government might exercise tyrannical control over its cltlzens. The separation of powers principle discussed by James Madison in The Federalist essays addresses this fear (Hamilton,Jay, and Madison 2001) . The Founders saw separation of powers and a federal system of government, also discussed in The Federalist, as bulwarks against a tyrannical central government.
More recently, public wariness about ID initiatives contributed to the abandonment of a 1965 Bureau of the Budget proposal for what would have been the federal government's first comprehensive databank of information on citizens, the National Data Center (Garfinkel 2000, 14) . The threat of terrorism only brief1y diminished resistance to a national In Altl10ugh a Harris poll taken immediately after the September 11 terrorist attacks found that 68 percent of Americans favored one, public support declined swiftly and to such an extent that a poll taken by the Gartner Group less than a year later found only 26 percent of Americans in favor of a national ID (Civil 2005) .
Public opposition has compelled most legislators to disavow a desire to create a federally-administered national In The Congressional Research Service noted that "prior to 9/11, legislation aimed at discouraging national standards for identification documents had gained bipartisan support and was thought likely to pass" [emphasis added] (Garcia, Lee, and Tatelman 2005, 38) . Indeed, House Judiciary Committee Chairman F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (R-WI) represented the driver's license provisions of the REAL ID Act as "the best antidote to a national identification card that we possibly can have" (Newsmaker 2005).
Because a federally-administered national ID is politically unpopular, policymakers eager to strengthen the country's personal identification system have concentrated on correcting weaknesses in the stateadministered driver's license, of which there are 240 variations (Grow 2003) . With the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986, Congress standardized the driver's license for interstate commercial drivers in order to deal with scofflaw truck drivers who applied for and received drivers' licenses from multiple states (Kernell and Jacobson 2003, 82 Congress Senate 2004, S 12010) . However, the conference committee deliberations preceding its approval had been contentious. Congress convened the conference committee to reconcile differences between the House bill (H.R. 10) and the Senate bill (S. 2845). The two bills differed in their approach to driver's license standardization: the Senate delegated authority to the executive branch to develop standards regarding the driver's license, whereas the House prescribed the standards (I-I.R. 102004). The House bill also contained language blocking the issuance of a driver's license to an illegal immigrant. Only about half of the states require that a driver's license applicant demonstrate lawful presence in the United States (Smith 2005, CRS-2) . This language was opposed by most Democrats and did not appear in the Senate bill. The House bill's sponsor, Representative Sensenbrenner (R-WI), and the members of the Congressional Immigration Reform Caucus led by Representative Torn Tancredo (R-CO) maintained that the immigration provisions were "essential to the war on terrorism," while its Democratic opponents argued that the provisions were "'extraneous' and unfair to Hispanic immigrants" (Dlouhy 2005b , Kady 2004 .
In order to ensure Senate Democratic support for and passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, the members of the conference committee adopted the Senate bill as the basis for their reconciliation work and rejected the language in the House bill on driver's license standards (putrich 2005).
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Rep. Sensenbrenner responded with a fierce denunciation:
The language in the conference report is worse than the current law, and it practically invites terrorists to come into the country and to apply for these critical identification documents. There is no enforcement or certification at the national level. There is no expiration of the licenses when the visas expire. There is no datasharing between the States. And any State can simply walk away from the few requirements that are in the bill. That does not sound like driver's license reform to me. Rather, it sounds like a recipe for disaster, the same kind of disaster that occurred on 9/11 (Sensenbrenner 2004, H 10998). Asking how legislators could face grieving survivors in the event of a future terrorist attack were Congress not to approve the language in the House bill, Rep. Sensenbrenner vowed to bring up his bill's driver's license provisions "relentlessly" and "not rest" until they were enacted into law (Sensenbrenner 2004, H 10998).
The House Republican leadership, recognizing the passion of the immigration provisions' supporters and fearing that they would impede expeditious passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, pledged to attach the House bill's driver's license language to "must-pass legislation," such as an appropriations bill, early in the upcoming session of Congress (\V'odele 2004 The Senate turned to a consideration of the REAL ID Act on April 6.
7 Although debate in the Senate was longer than in the House-two weeks rather than two days-many senators objected that, like their colleagues in the House, they had been given insufficient opportunity to voice their concerns about the REAL ID Act. Congress convened a conference committee on April 27 and 28 to reconcile the House and Senate versions of the emergency supplemental appropriations measure. The tone of the conference committee's deliberations reflected that of earlier legislative action on the REAL ID Act. Representative John Conyers, Jr. (D-MI), ranking Democrat on the House Judiciary Committee, charged that "Democrats were shut out of all negotiations in conference and none of our concerns were addressed" (Stern 2005b ). Echoing observations made by Sen. Byrd and others, he asserted that Congress adopted the REAL ID Act provisions "without hearings, review, negotiation or debate" (Stern 2005b Conferees made two noteworthy modifications, however: States were released fmm a mandate to share driver's data with Canada and Mexico and were authorized to issue, in addition to the higher level driver's license for those who could prove citizenship 01' legal residency, a lower level certificate of driving for those who could not (Stern 2005a; Stern 2005e) .
The success of the House Republican leadership's "must-pass" strategy, which relied on the reluctance of members of Congress to block a bill appropriating funds for troops overseas, was reflected in the final votes on the emergency supplemental appropriations measure. On May 5, the House agreed to the confeJ:ence report by a vote of 368-58 and on May 10, the Senate agreed by a vote of 100-0 (U. S 
THE REAL ID ACT'S IMPACT ON STATES AND LOCALITIES
Critics of the REAL ID Act driver's license provisions object not only to the process by which they were enacted into law, but also to their impact. Federalism advocates, for example, charge that the provisions impinge on state sovereignty. Representative Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-1X) has called the REAL ID Act "an assault on federalism" and Representative Ron Paul (D-TX) has argued that "federally imposed standards for driver's licenses and birth certificates make a mockery of federalism and the 10th Amendment" (2005, H 438; For 2005, 7) .
Rep. Paul believes that the REAL ID Act "transforms state motor vehicle departments into agents of the federal government" (For 2005, 7) . The scholarship of federalism lends credence to his charge. Kettl has noted "the growing importance of state and local governments as administrative agents of national programs" (2004, 113) . ''Administtative federalism" is the phrase he employs to describe this phenomenon, by which the federal government leverages "the activity of state and local governments to do much of its work" (2004, 113) .
For a legislative body tackling the challenge of developing a secure system of personal identification, administrative federalism has powerful appeal. It allows Congress to limit the burden it places on a shrinking federal bureaucracy, control costs on the federal level during a period of significant budget deficits, and obscure its role in developing what some citizens consider a national ID. Kernell and Jacobson explain the incentives of administrative federalism in this way:
When members of Congress pass a law that obliges the states to provide particular services, they are yielding to a temptation all politicians share: the desire to respond to some citizens' demands without imposing costs on others. In forcing the states to pay for a program, members are imposing costs for which they will not be held accountable (2003, 97). The costs imposed by the driver's license provision of the REAL ID Act are both figurative and literal. The figurative cost takes the form of preemptions of state authority. The Congressional Budget Office has identified four preemptions of state authority in the REAL ID Act, stemming from its requirements for uniform license design, valid identification documents, mandatory license expiration date, and resolution of discrepancies in social security numbers (U. S. Congress Congressional Budget 2005) . Such preemptions are likely to displace state policy goals. State government officials fear, for example, that requiring proof of lawful presence in the United States will undermine their efforts to ensure public safety on the highways. They believe that a large group of unlicensed, uninsured motorists who do not know the rules of the road will increase the number of accidents and strain emergency services (Smith 2005, CRS-l) . Their concern is wellfounded. The American Automobile Association Foundation for Traffic Safety has determined that "unlicensed drivers are almost five times more likely to be in fatal car accidents than are validly licensed drivers" (Roybal-Allard 2005, H 560).
In its 1996 draft report on federal mandates, the Advis01), Commission on Intergovernmental Relations categorized mandates by whether there exists "a sufficient national interest to justify intruding on state and local government abilities to control their own affairs" (US. Advisory 1996, 291 (1994, 150) .
States may, of course, ignore the driver's license provisions of the REAL ID Act, which apply only to licenses that will be used for federal identification purposes. However, any individual who expects to board an airplane, enter a federally-protected building, buy firearms, serve on a jury, register to vote, collect Social Security and veterans benefits, or use other federal government services will want an ID that conforms to the driver's license standards of the REAL ID Act. The states, in reality, must implement the standards. As Kettl has observed about administrative and fiscal federalism, "the states usually have discretion about whether to enlist as national agents, but the construction of the programs typically leaves them little choice" (2004, 113) .
The literal cost imposed by the driver's license provisions of the REAL ID Act takes the form of an unfunded mandate. The Congressional Budget Office has identified several "intergovernmental mandates" in the REAL ID Act, although it notes that the costs to the states imposed by the act are within the allowable threshold established by the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 
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Secretary of Homeland Security to make grants to the states. However, Rep. Davis has acknowledged that insufficient federal funds are available to cover the full cost to the states of implementing the driver's license provisions of the REAL ID Act (Grimes 2005). In addition to fiscal burdens, the driver's license provisions of the REAL ID Act pose operational challenges to state and local governments. Perhaps the most serious of these is the requirement that states verify the validity of documents presented by driver's license applicants. Thousands of separate government entities, large and small, technologically sophisticated and unsophisticated, issue birth records. The NGA, NCSL, and AAMVA point out that the REAL ID Act imposes "technological standards and verification procedures on states, many of which are beyond the current capacity of even the federal government" (Lieberman 2005 , S 4003). They note tl1at "while the act contemplates the use of five national electronic systems to facilitate verification, currently only one of these systems is available on a nationwide basis" (National Governors Association National 2006, 3).
IMPLEMENTING THE REAL ID
ACT THROUGH RULEMAKING
Given the constitutional issues and implementation problems raised by the driver's license provisions of the REAL ID Act, active stakeholder involvement would seem important to the success of their implementation. Unfortunately, the constricted opportunity for debate on the REAL ID Act in Congress is mirrored in the limited opportunity for stakeholder involvement in the rulemaking process.
The implementation stage in the life of a law is controlled by the degree of authority Congress delegates to the executive branch and the type of rulemaking it mandates. In the REAL ID Act, Congress limited its delegation of authority to the Secretary of Homeland Security by dictating driver's license standards in much greater detail than in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. In addition, Congress prohibited negotiated rulemaldng and mandated nothing more than "a conventional regulatory notice procedure" (U. S. Congress Congressional Record 2005c , H 2876 .
The requirements of conventional regulatory notice-that is, notice and comment rulemaking-are outlined in the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. Under notice and comment rulemaking, also known as informal rulemaking, an agency announces its intention to develop regulations with a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the Federal Register, the federal government publication that provides official notice of all regulations affecting citizens. The agency invites comments on the proposed rule and may, if it chooses, provide for other forms of public participation in the development of the rule. The agency must be able to prove, if it is challenged in court, that it took stakeholder input into consideration when it wrote the final rule.
Kerwin has described notice and comment rulemaking as "a minimalist approach to public involvement" (2003, 165 As its first step in the rulemaking process, an agency using negotiated rulemaking convenes a committee of stakeholders to develop a proposed rule. Representatives from relevant federal agencies and all groups substantially affected by the rule comprise the committee. The committee members work together, often with the assistance of an impartial facilitator, to reach consensus on the content of tile rule. The agency may adopt the committee's proposed rule, develop a different rule, or choose not to issue a rule. If the agency decides to proceed with rulemaking, it follows the conventional notice and comment rulemaking process.
Negotiated rulemaking, also known as regulatory negotiation or reg neg, has two advantages that are particularly important when an agency develops rules to implement a policy as controversial as federal government standardization of the driver's license. First, stakeholders have an opportunity not only to provide written comments on a proposed rule, but also to actively shape its content before the written comment phase of the rulemaking process. Kerwin observes that reg neg "offers the public the most direct and influential role in rulemaking of any reform of the process ever devised" (2003, 197) . Second, the face-to-face negotiation that occurs in the first step of the negotiated rule making process makes this form of rulemaking less adversarial and more consensusbased than informal rulemaking (Harter 1982, 18) . Participation and consensus lend a reg neg rule legitimacy, which facilitates the rule's implementation (Freeman and Langbein 2000; 63, 67) . Harter contends that "a regulation that is developed by and has the support of the respective interests would have a political legitimacy that regulations developed under any other process arguably lack" (1982, 7) .
Negotiated rulemaking has disadvantages, however. Williams argues that reg neg "emphasizes the interests of individuals and interest groups more than those of the public at large," a concern sometimes referred to as "agency capture" (2000). Kelwin has observed that reg neg is expensive and that public participation can "complicate rulemaking and place the agency squarely between powerful contending forces" (2003, 160, 201) . Harter acknowledges that negotiation, used inappropriately, "could simply add another layer to the already protracted rulemaking process" (1982, 7) . Congressional sponsors of the REAL ID Act, eager to develop a more secure system of personal identification as expeditiously as possible, may have had these disadvantages in mind when they mandated a less collaborative form of rulemaking. 
THE FUTURE OF DRIVER'S LICENSE STANDARDIZATION
The still-unfolding history of the REAL ID Act supports former Senator Alan K. Simpson's contention that "no problem was ever more apparent than the susceptibility of federal, state, and local documents to fraud and misuse. And no problem was ever politically more difficult than trying .to pass legislation to improve these documents" (U. S. Congress House 2002, 26 US. 144 (1992) and Printz v. United States, 521 U. S. 898, 935 (1997) (Garcia, Lee, and Tatelman 2005, CRS-39) . The CRS has also argued, however, that Congress has the authority to pass legislation affecting the issuance of a driver's license to an illegal alien, given its "power to regulate immigration and commerce ... ability to set conditions on the receipt of federal funds, and ... discretion to set standards for identification documents that can be accepted for purposes of federal programs" (Smith 2005 , CRS-2). 
